The Future of Food Depends on Cyber Resilience

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The Future of Food Depends on Cyber Resilience

About ten years ago, I visited a relative’s dairy farm and got my first real appreciation for how much technology had already become part of modern agriculture. The farm had a robotic milking system that recognized each cow, monitored its condition, and managed the milking process. What impressed me wasn’t just the technology itself, but what it made possible for a family operation: more flexibility, less time spent on repetitive tasks, and more opportunity to give individual animals attention when they needed it.

A few years later, I met a technology executive from a greenhouse operation who described how they were using automated visual systems to identify ripe peppers and detect pests. Once again, I was struck by how sophisticated agricultural technology had become, and how little I’d previously appreciated the extent of it.

Both experiences stayed with me. Coming from a cybersecurity background, I could see the benefits of this technology, but I also wondered about the dependencies it created. What happened when these systems stopped working? How well were they protected? And were the people relying on them aware of the risks?

Those questions were part of what drew me to the SECURE-AGRO Fall Institute at the University of Guelph this October. I wanted to better understand the realities of Canadian agriculture and explore where my experience in cybersecurity might contribute to the conversation.

I came away with a stronger appreciation for the complexity of our food system, but also a concern that I’ve encountered in other critical industries: technology adoption has moved faster than awareness of the cybersecurity risks that come with it.

An increasingly connected industry

One of the challenges I see for agriculture is that operations which have traditionally been quite independent are becoming interconnected in ways that aren’t always obvious. A farm may operate independently from its neighbours, but several producers could rely on the same equipment manufacturer, software provider, or technology platform. A compromise affecting one of those suppliers can disrupt many producers at once.

We’ve seen similar dependencies create problems in other industries. Organizations may have strong internal practices but still find themselves exposed through a third-party provider. And when the affected technology is essential to production, the consequences can be much more serious than an ordinary IT outage.

There’s also a question of preparedness. Can operations function without the technology they now depend on? Many systems have manual alternatives, but that doesn’t necessarily mean those alternatives have been tested or are even practical for an extended period. If automation normally handles work that would require a substantial number of people to perform manually, what does a realistic fallback look like?

These are questions worth asking whether a disruption is caused by a cyberattack, an equipment failure, or a connectivity issue. The ability to continue operating, even at reduced capacity, can make an enormous difference to the outcome.

When cybersecurity affects physical operations

Agricultural businesses face the same cyber threats as other businesses, including financial fraud, compromised accounts, and ransomware. But they also share characteristics with manufacturing, healthcare, and other sectors where technology directly affects physical operations.

That changes the nature of the risk.

In poultry production, for example, a ventilation failure can become an animal welfare emergency in minutes. If an attacker can interfere with the systems controlling that environment, cybersecurity becomes part of protecting the flock, not simply protecting the technology.

Food safety raises similar concerns. Monitoring, testing, and production records are essential to maintaining confidence in the food supply. An incident that compromises the integrity of those systems could create consequences well beyond the directly affected organization.

And then there’s timing. An equipment disruption during harvest, or a problem at a centralized storage or processing facility, can have effects that extend across multiple operations and can’t necessarily be resolved simply by getting the technology working again.

These are the kinds of scenarios that make operational resilience so important. Before deciding how to protect a system, we need to understand what depends on it, what could go wrong, and how quickly the consequences might become serious.

Trust, technology, and shared responsibility

Agriculture relies on strong relationships with equipment manufacturers, software providers, and service partners. Once a supplier has earned a producer’s trust, there’s a reasonable expectation that they’re looking after the technology they provide. But that trust can also make it easy to assume that security is being looked after, without necessarily knowing what protections are in place or where responsibility lies.

Remote access is a good example. A producer wouldn’t ordinarily allow a service technician to come and go from their property at any hour without knowing why they were there. Yet the digital equivalent can happen when vendors have ongoing access to connected equipment, sometimes without the operator knowing when or how that access is being used. It’s a convenient arrangement for maintenance and support, but it also creates a potential entry point for an attacker, particularly if the vendor’s own systems are compromised.

This doesn’t mean that producers should stop trusting their suppliers. It does mean that you should ask some questions about how that trust is supported:

  • Who can access the equipment remotely?
  • How is that access controlled?
  • Are there default passwords that I should change?
  • What happens if the vendor experiences a security incident?

In my experience, the way a provider responds to these questions can tell you a great deal about how seriously they take security. A willingness to explain their practices and acknowledge areas for improvement inspires far more confidence than vague assurances that everything is protected.

The same principle applies to outsourced IT services. There’s nothing wrong with relying on outside expertise, and most businesses couldn’t reasonably manage every aspect of their technology themselves. But whether it’s an equipment vendor or an IT provider, handing over responsibility for managing a system doesn’t mean handing over all responsibility for the risks it creates. You don’t need to become a cybersecurity expert, but you do need enough awareness to ask informed questions and understand where your responsibilities begin and end.

Agriculture has a strong risk management foundation to build on

One of the most encouraging things I took away from SECURE-AGRO was the recognition that agriculture already has considerable experience managing complex, shared risks.

Disease prevention and response provide a useful example. The established approaches to biosecurity, reporting, and coordinated responses in poultry production offer principles that could be adapted to cybersecurity. Early detection, clear communication, containment, and knowing who is responsible for what are just as valuable when responding to a digital threat.

I see a real opportunity for industry associations, producer organizations, and supply boards to help make cybersecurity more accessible. Businesses within a particular sector often use similar technologies, which means they may also share many of the same vulnerabilities. Developing practical guidance and response approaches around those common risks could be far more effective than expecting every operation to work everything out independently.

There’s also an opportunity to build a culture where people feel comfortable reporting incidents and asking for help. Cybercriminals often exploit the isolation and embarrassment their victims experience. An industry that already understands the importance of coordinated responses to shared threats has a foundation for addressing that problem.

The important thing is to establish those relationships and processes before they’re needed. When an incident occurs, there may be very little time to decide who to contact or how to respond.

Starting with awareness and preparation

I recognize that agriculture has no shortage of competing priorities, and cybersecurity can easily look like another expensive, complicated problem to manage. But meaningful improvements don’t always require major investments.

The first step is understanding what technology an operation depends on, who has access to it, and what the consequences would be if it became unavailable or started behaving unexpectedly. From there, some of the improvements are straightforward: changing default passwords, avoiding shared accounts, reviewing remote access, and ensuring equipment isn’t unnecessarily exposed to the internet. For more complex environments, it’s worth examining how business IT systems connect to operational technology and whether those connections are appropriately protected.

Just as important is thinking through what happens when something fails. How quickly would the problem be detected? Can the operation continue safely? Who needs to be contacted, and what resources would be available to help?

The answers will be different for every business, which is why cybersecurity needs to reflect operational realities rather than being treated as a standard checklist.

Preparation for a cyber incident also helps with other disruptions. A business that understands its dependencies and has practiced how to operate without certain systems is better positioned to handle an equipment failure or connectivity outage, too.

Learning from other industries before it’s too late

One of my frustrations after years in cybersecurity is how often we recognize risks long before organizations take meaningful action. We’ve seen this pattern across critical industries: technology becomes essential, vulnerabilities and dependencies emerge, and concerns are raised. Too often, significant improvements happen only after a serious incident.

I hope agriculture can take a different path.

At White Tuque, we work with organizations to understand cybersecurity risks and build resilience around the systems their businesses depend on. Our experience in other industries, including environments where operational technology and business IT intersect, provides a useful perspective. But that expertise needs to be combined with the knowledge agricultural professionals have of their own operations.

That’s one of the reasons I valued attending SECURE-AGRO. There is a great deal cybersecurity professionals can learn from the agricultural sector, just as there are lessons from other industries that agriculture can put to use. I believe there’s an opportunity to bring those perspectives together through stronger collaboration between producers, technology providers, industry organizations, and cybersecurity specialists.

My biggest takeaway from the Institute was the importance of awareness and preparation. We don’t need every producer to become a cybersecurity expert, and we don’t need to solve every problem immediately. But we do need to recognize that connected technology is now part of the infrastructure supporting Canada’s food supply, and its security deserves the same consideration as other operational risks.

Other critical industries have learned some of these lessons through painful experience. Agriculture has an opportunity to get ahead of them, and I’d like to see us take it.

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A Collaborative Article by Laura Payne & Eric Broda This article was written collaboratively by White Tuque’s Laura Payne, together with Eric Broda of Broda Group Software and The Agentic Mesh Company. By combining expertise

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Robert D. Stewart

Founder & Head, Strategic Threat Intelligence

Robert is a technology incident and crisis management specialist with over 3200 hours leading critical recoveries and investigations within regulated industries.

Robert has built cyber incident and global crisis processes for the Fusion Centres of two major North American banks. With an extensive focus on operational resiliency, Robert worked as a Global Crisis Management Specialist, leading the technical migration for the pandemic for a multi-national financial institution.

Robert is a threat intelligence specialist focused on preventing large scale incidents and attacks before they happen, with unparalleled experience in incident response: 650 critical incidents within the global financial sector leading to the recovery of over 250 unique global financial systems, with 6000 executive communications and briefings issued, and over 200 post-incident reviews.